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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 726, 
AFL-CIO and AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
DIVISION 1056, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- ' CASE NOS. U-17434 
& U-17435 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17447 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and MANHATTAN 
AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Respondents. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS (KENT Y. HIROZAWA of counsel), 
for Amalgamated Transit Union, Divisions 72 6 and 1056, 
AFL-CIO 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (MALCOLM A. GOLDSTEIN 
of counsel) for Local 100, Transport Workers Union, AFL-CIO 
MARTIN A. SCHNABEL (KENNETH H. SCHIFFRON and AUDREY DANIEL 
of counsel), for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Manhattan and Bronx 
Board - U-17434, U-17435 & U-17447 -2 
Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) finding that they violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The charges allege that NYCTA and MABSTOA unilaterally 
promulgated and implemented work rules and penalties affecting 
certain employees of NYCTA represented by the Amalgamated Transit 
Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO and the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Division 1056, AFL-CIO (ATU) and employees of NYCTA and MABSTOA 
represented by Local 100, Transport Workers Union, AFL-CIO (TWU). 
The new rules were allegedly more stringent and carried greater 
penalties than those set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) 
Article 19A, §509-c-/ pertaining to the disqualification of bus 
drivers. 
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in lieu of a 
hearing. The ALJ thereafter issued a decision finding that the 
work rules involved mandatory subjects of negotiation. He 
further found that VTL §509-j(b)2/ did not exempt NYCTA and 
MABSTOA from bargaining the promulgation and implementation of 
work rules which exceeded the requirements of VTL §509-c. 
-'•'VTL §509-c sets forth the conditions under which a bus driver 
may be disqualified from driving a bus. 
-'VTL §509-j (b) provides, with respect to the grounds for 
disqualification of bus drivers, that 
(b) Nothing contained herein shall prevent a motor 
carrier or political subdivision from imposing 
qualifications that are more stringent than those 
contained in this article .... 
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NYCTA and MABSTOA filed exceptions arguing that the ALJ 
erred in determining that they had not been excused from any 
bargaining obligation by virtue of the language of VTL §509-j(b) 
and in determining that the subject matter of the charges was a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. ATU and TWU thereafter filed a 
motion with us seeking a determination that NYCTA and MABSTOA 
were foreclosed from raising in the exceptions the negotiability 
of the work rules by virtue of the stipulation of fact entered 
into by the parties in lieu of a hearing. We issued a decision 
denying the motion to strike parts of NYCTA's and MABSTOA's 
exceptions and brief, finding that the issues raised by the 
motion were properly addressed when the entire case was ready for 
decision and not as an interlocutory appeal.^ 
NYCTA and MABSTOA previously utilized the disqualification 
standards set forth in VTL §509-c as the criteria to determine 
whether and to what extent bus drivers would be warned, 
reprimanded, reclassified or suspended based upon their driving 
records. On December 8 and 15, 1995, the NYCTA issued two 
memoranda to all NYCTA and MABSTOA bus drivers, implementing more 
stringent standards than those set forth in VTL §509-c for 
traffic accidents, drug and/or alcohol convictions and moving 
violations. The parties stipulated that it was the position of 
NYCTA and MABSTOA that the revised standards are not mandatory 
subjects of negotiation by virtue of VTL §509-j(b). The parties 
-
7New York City Transit Authority and Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
Transit Operating Authority, 30 PERB f3006 (1997). 
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further stipulated that NYCTA and MABSTOA believed they were 
acting pursuant to managerial prerogatives and that was why they 
had determined that the revised standards would not be subject to 
the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures. 
Initially, we deal with the issues raised by ATU and TWU in 
their interlocutory appeal and again in their responses to the 
exceptions filed by NYCTA and MABSTOA. Notwithstanding ATU's and 
TWU's interpretation of the stipulation of facts, NYCTA and 
MABSTOA are not precluded from raising the negotiability of the 
revised standards in the exceptions. The ALJ did not read the 
stipulation as limiting him solely to a determination of the 
legislative intent of VTL §509-j(b) and neither do we. The 
stipulation clearly puts in issue the negotiability of the 
revised standards by referencing both the defenses raised in the 
answer filed by NYCTA and MABSTOA and its position that because 
the revised standards were enacted pursuant to managerial 
prerogative they could not be reviewed in the context of the 
contractual grievance arbitration procedure. In any event, it is 
certainly within our power to consider any relevant legal theory 
in our analysis of the negotiability of the subject matter of an 
improper practice charge alleging a unilateral change or a 
refusal to negotiate in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, 
whether or not a party has advanced that legal theory to us.^ 
^Sidney Cent. Sch. Dist.. 28 PERB f3032 (1995). 
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Turning to the merits of the charge, after a careful review 
of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALT. 
ATU and TWU argue that the revised standards are work rules 
and that NYCTA's and MABSTOA's implementation of them affects 
terms and conditions of employment. It is further argued that 
the revised standards carry a disciplinary component which is 
itself mandatorily negotiable. NYCTA and MABSTOA argue that the 
standards are in fact qualifications for employment, are within 
their managerial prerogative to implement unilaterally and are 
sanctioned by VTL §509-j(b). . 
Under the prior standards, bus drivers may be required to 
take a road test, face eighteen months probation or from one to 
five years of disqualification as a bus driver for the 
accumulation of points on their licenses, involvement in 
accidents, drug and/or alcohol possession and moving violations, 
as specifically provided in VTL §509-c. Adverse actions taken 
against an employee under these circumstances could be addressed 
through the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure.^ 
Under the revised standards, employees' driving records are 
reviewed for a longer period of time and with more stringent 
requirements and employees may be required to take a road test, 
face from six months to two years probation or a one year 
-'Such adverse actions have included discharge, suspension, 
demotion to nondriving positions (NYCTA only) or retraining, 
reclassification, and reprimands. 
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disqualification. For the first time, bus drivers may be 
permanently disqualified from driving a bus for various repeat 
offenses and be removed from their jobs permanently or for an 
extended period of time.-7 
In County of Montgomery^7, we reviewed a similar policy 
unilaterally implemented by the employer. There, County 
employees who drove County-owned vehicles were required to 
possess a valid New York State driver's license. The County then 
unilaterally imposed a requirement that those employees apply for 
and obtain a County driving permit. The issuance of the permit 
was dependent upon the County's review of the employee's driving 
record, both on and off the job. Failure to obtain the permit 
involved the employee in an appeal procedure. In the meantime, 
the employee could not operate a County vehicle. Refusal to 
participate in the process resulted in discipline. We found the 
imposition of the permit requirement to violate §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act because it was a new condition of employment, involving a 
disciplinary component, unilaterally imposed upon the employees. 
^For example, under the old standards, an employee involved in 
three accidents in an eighteen month period would be required to 
take a road test. After passing the road test, the employee 
would be on probation for eighteen months. Three more accidents 
within the probation period would result in the employee being 
disqualified for one year. Under the revised standards, an 
employee having three accidents in a twenty-four month period 
would be subject to the road test requirement. After passing the 
road test, the employee would be on probation for twenty-four 
months and three accidents within that period would result in 
permanent disqualification. 
•^ 18 PERB f3077 (1985) . 
Board - U-17434, U-17435 & U-17447 -7 
Here, the employees were required to possess a valid New 
York State driver's license and meet the requirements of VTL 
§509-c to drive buses for NYCTA and MABSTOA. NYCTA and MABSTOA 
now require that the bus drivers represented by ATU and TWU meet 
additional conditions, in excess of those required under the 
Vehicle and Traffic Law. Failure to comply with the revised 
standards results in reclassification, reprimand, demotion, 
suspension or discharge. These revised standards are no 
different from the imposition of the permit requirement we found 
negotiable in County of Montgomery. It is a new condition 
created by NYCTA and MABSTOA for continued employment imposed 
upon current employees and failure to comply with it results in 
discipline or discharge. The grounds for the imposition of 
discipline and the penalty to be imposed are likewise mandatorily 
negotiable.27 Therefore, NYCTA and MABSTOA violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Act when the revised standards were unilaterally 
implemented unless VTL §509-j either directs that such action be 
taken, thereby leaving no discretion to these employers to 
negotiate, or establishes a plain and clear legislative intent to 
exempt the employers from a duty to bargain. 
The language of VTL §509-j provides that nothing contained 
therein shall prevent a political subdivision from imposing 
qualifications that are more stringent than those contained in 
that article. The parties concede, and the record shows, that 
g/Citv of Buffalo. 23 PERB f3050 (1990); New York City Transit 
Auth.. 20 PERB 53037 (1987), aff'd. 147 A.D.2d 574, 22 PERB 17001 
(2d Dep't 1989). 
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the revised standards promulgated and implemented by NYCTA and 
MABSTOA are more stringent than the grounds for disqualification 
set forth in VTL §509-c. In Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York v. PERB.27 the Court of 
Appeals stated that: 
The obligation under the Taylor Law to bargain as to 
all terms and conditions of employment is a "strong and 
sweeping policy of the State". (footnote omitted) 
The Court recognized that the Legislature might abrogate this 
obligation by the explicit terms of a statute or by implication 
inherent in a statute or a statutory scheme. In Webster Central 
School District v. PERB.—' the Court held that: 
While legislative expression is the best evidence of 
legislative intent, it is not the only evidence; 
legislative intent may also be implied from the words 
of an enactment. It should be apparent, however, that 
in order to overcome the strong State policy favoring 
the bargaining of terms and conditions of employment, 
any implied intention that there not be mandatory 
negotiation must be "plain and clear" (Syracuse 
Teachers Assoc.. Inc. v. Board of Educ.. 35 N.Y.2d 743, 
744), or "inescapably implicit" in the statute (Matter 
of Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Assn., 
40 N.Y.2d 774, 778; see also. Matter of City School 
Dist. of City of Elmira v. New York State Pub. 
Employment Relations Bd., 74 N.Y.2d 395). Anything 
less threatens to erode and eviscerate the mandate of 
collective bargaining. 
The language of VTL §509-j does not prohibit bargaining more 
stringent requirements, neither is it "so unequivocal a directive 
to take certain action that it leaves no room for bargaining."117 
^75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 57012, at 7013 (1990). 
i2775 N.Y.2d 619, 23 PERB 17013, at 7018 (1990) 
^Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York 
V. PERB. supra, at 7013 (1990). 
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There is no evidence of a legislative intent to grant NYCTA and 
MABSTOA a right to take any specific action with respect to 
broader bases for disqualification of bus drivers free from the 
bargaining obligations imposed by the Act. NYCTA and MABSTOA 
are, therefore, left with the discretion to act and thus, have 
the duty to negotiate any revised, more rigorous, standards for 
bus drivers. The unilateral implementation of new work standards 
and the imposition of greater penalties violates §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALT is affirmed. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that NYCTA and MABSTOA 
1. Restore the standards for the removal from service of a 
bus driver for convictions for DWI or DUI, accidents and 
moving violations in effect prior to the issuance of the 
December 8 and 15, 1995 memoranda; 
2. Make whole any affected unit employees for any wages and 
benefits lost that would not have been lost but for the 
implementation of the December 8 and 15, 1995 memoranda, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate; 
3. Amend any and all records of disciplinary action taken 
pursuant to the implementation of the December 8 and 15, 
1995 memoranda to delete any reference to any disciplinary 
action taken pursuant to those memoranda which would not 
have been taken under the standards in effect prior to the 
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implementation of the December 8 and 15, 1995 memoranda, and 
substitute, where appropriate, the action which would have 
been taken under the prior standards; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used by NYCTA and MABSTOA to post notices of 
information with employees represented by ATU and TWU. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit 
Operating Authority (MABSTOA) in the units represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 726 and 1056, AFL-CIO 
and Local 100, Transport Workers Union, AFL-CIO, that NYCTA and MABSTOA shall: 
1. Restore the standards for the removal from service of a bus driver for convictions for DWI or DUI, accidents 
and moving violations in effect prior to the issuance of the December 8 and 15,1995 memoranda. 
2. Make whole any affected unit employees for any wages and benefits lost that would not have been lost but 
for the implementation of the December 8 and 15,1995 memoranda, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
) 3. Amend any and all records of disciplinary action taken pursuant to the implementation of the December 8 
and 15, 1995 memoranda to delete any reference to any disciplinary action taken pursuant to those 
memoranda which would not have been taken under the standards in effect prior to the implementation of 
the December 8 and 15,1995 memoranda, and substitute, where appropriate, the action which would have 
been taken under the prior standards. 
Dated By . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
NYCTA and MABSTOA 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AUBURN TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2476, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18419 
AUBURN ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER C. LUDDEN, for Charging Party 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Auburn 
Teachers' Association, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 2476 
(Association) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing as deficient a 
charge against the Auburn Enlarged City School District 
(District) alleging that the District violated §209-a.1(a) and 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally discontinued a practice pursuant to which unit 
employees were allowed to take time off from work for religious 
observance without charge to accrued leave time. 
The Director dismissed the charge on the basis of our recent 
decision in Eastchester Union Free School District^7 (hereafter 
Eastchester). In Eastchester. we concluded that the Court of 
I/29 PERB 53041 (1996) . 
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Appeals' decision in Griffin v. Coughlin^ compelled a 
determination that the practice of granting employees paid time 
off for religious observance without charge to leave accruals was 
an unconstitutional establishment of religion and, therefore, not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. The rescission of such a 
practice, therefore, was held to not constitute a violation of 
the Act. 
The Association's exceptions, although questioning the 
wisdom of our considering a constitutional issue,-7 set forth no 
basis to distinguish Eastchesterf which the District argues was 
properly applied by the Director in dismissing the charge. 
This case has the same fact pattern as the one in 
Eastchester. On the basis of our decision in Eastchester, the 
Association's exceptions are denied and the Director's decision 
is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it is 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
^88 N.Y.2d 674 (1996). 
-
7In Eastchester. we expressed our extreme reluctance to address 
constitutional issues, but concluded that it was necessary to do 
so when the constitutionality of a practice is dispositive of the 
question whether the practice is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17856 
TOWN OF CORTLANDT, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
THOMAS F. WOOD, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Cortlandt (Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a charge filed by the New York State Federation of 
Police, Inc. (Federation). The Federation alleges in its charge 
that the Town violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it adopted and implemented a General 
Municipal Law (GML) §207-c policy and procedure applicable to unit 
police officers who are injured or become ill as a result of their 
job duties. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ held that several aspects of 
the Town's GML §207-c policy and procedures were mandatorily 
negotiable subjects. Therefore, he held that the Town's 
unilateral promulgation and implementation of those procedures and 
policy violated the Act as alleged. As relevant to the Town's 
exceptions, the ALJ held the following parts of the GML §207-c 
Board - U-17856 -2 
policy and procedure to be mandatory-' subjects of negotiation: 
1. Termination of any police officer who has received GML §207-c 
benefits for one year or more;-7 2. A requirement that a police 
officer notify the Town within fixed times of any job related 
accident, injury or illness with disqualification for GML §207-c 
benefits for noncompliance with the notice requirements; 3. A 
requirement that a police officer applying for GML §207-c use 
accumulated leave credits until the Town makes a determination on 
GML §207-c eligibility subject to restoration if the officer is 
determined to be eligible under that statute; and 4. A ten-day 
time limit for appealing a proposed light-duty assignment or GML 
§207-c benefit determination. 
The Town excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the above parts 
of its policy and procedures are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. It argues that these four parts of its policy and 
procedures are consistent with its managerial rights under law, 
are not in any respect disciplinary in nature and, as to the 
^The ALJ held that several parts of the GML §207-c procedures 
were not mandatorily negotiable and he dismissed the charge to 
that extent. No exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's decision 
in this respect. 
^Upon termination, the police officer retains the right to 
salary and medical payments as required by GML §2 07-c, but loses 
eligibility for all benefits under the applicable collective 
bargaining agreements between the Town and the Federation. An 
exception is provided if the police officer has a retirement 
application pending with the Retirement System. In that 
circumstance, the officer retains contractual medical and dental 
insurance pending a determination on the application. 
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required use of leave credits, merely codify the parties' past 
practice. 
The Federation argues in response that the GML §207-c policy 
and procedures subject to review under these exceptions are 
mandatorily negotiable for the reasons set forth by the ALJ. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Preliminarily, that part of the Town's exceptions in which it 
argues that the required use of leave credits pending a GML §207-c 
eligibility determination was not a change in existing practice 
must be denied.-' Having stipulated that the GML §207-c policy 
and procedures were adopted and implemented unilaterally, it was 
incumbent upon the Town to prove that its unilateral action merely 
codified existing, unwritten practices. There is not on this 
record any allegation in that regard or even argument to that 
general effect. 
The only issues remaining concern negotiability. In that 
respect, our decision in City of Schenectady^7 is dispositive as 
to those aspects of the Town's GML §207-c procedures numbered 
herein as 2, 3 and 4. We held in City of Schenectady that as GML 
§207-c benefits are a form of wages, procedures which condition, 
^Had the procedures merely codified the Town's existing 
practice, the Town's adoption of a policy or procedures statement 
would not have violated its bargaining obligations under a 
unilateral change theory. 
^25 PERB 53022 (1992), aff'd, 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB J[7005 
(1995) . 
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restrict or potentially deny an employee's receipt of those 
benefits are terms and conditions of employment within the meaning 
of the Act, which must be negotiated before they are adopted or 
implemented except as negotiations are preempted by law or public 
policy. As neither law nor public policy prohibits negotiations 
or renders the subject matters in issue nonmandatory, the ALT 
correctly held the GML §207-c procedures in issue mandatorily 
negotiable. 
The Town's policy requiring termination of employment and 
loss of contract benefits after one year or more of receipt of GML 
§207-c benefits requires a different analysis because that policy 
does not affect a police officer's receipt of GML §207-c statutory 
benefits as do the procedures numbered 2, 3 and 4. 
Whether or not disciplinary in nature, the grounds upon which 
an employee is discharged from employment are necessarily 
mandatory subjects of bargaining because termination from 
employment on any ground occasions the loss of all terms and 
conditions incident to that employment. Changes in the grounds 
for termination from employment are mandatorily negotiable unless 
termination is required by law or controlling provisions of law 
establish a legislative intent to exempt an employer from a duty 
to bargain the decision to terminate. 
The Town does not argue that any provision of law requires it 
to terminate an employee after one year of absence from work. It 
does argue, however, that Civil Service Law (CSL) §71, as 
interpreted, allows it to terminate an employee after a cumulative 
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absence from work for one year and its exercise of that right 
should not be subject to any bargaining obligation under the Act. 
The ALJ understood that the Town's argument in this respect 
rested upon CSL §73, an argument raised, apparently erroneously, 
by the Town in its answer. CSL §73 deals with separation from 
service due to nonoccupational injuries or illness and it is 
admittedly inapplicable to any analysis of the Town's termination 
policy, which applies only to occupational injuries or illness. 
The Town's brief to the ALJ, however, relies upon 
CSL §71. As the question before us involves only an issue of law, 
the relevance of CSL §71 to the required negotiability analysis is 
properly before us whether or not it had been raised by the Town. 
We could not hold the Town in violation of the Act if on any 
theory the unilateral change was to a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation.^7 
Civil Service Law §71 provides as follows: 
Where an employee has been separated from the service 
by reason of a disability resulting from occupational 
injury or disease as defined in the workmen's 
compensation law, he shall be entitled to a leave of 
absence for at least one year, unless his disability is 
of such a nature as to permanently incapacitate him from 
the performance of the duties of his position. Such 
employee may, within one year after the termination of 
such disability, make application to the civil service 
department or municipal commission having jurisdiction 
over the position last held by such employee for a 
medical examination to be conducted by a medical officer 
selected for that purpose by such department or 
commission. If, upon such medical examination, such 
^A party is not prohibited from raising new legal arguments in 
support of unchanged claims. Sidney Cent. Sch. Dist.. 28 PERB 
f3032 (1995) . 
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medical officer shall certify that such person is 
physically and mentally fit to perform the duties of his 
former position, he shall be reinstated to his former 
position, if vacant, or to a vacancy in a similar 
position or a position in a lower grade in the same 
occupational field, or to a vacant position for which he 
was eligible for transfer. If no appropriate vacancy 
shall exist to which reinstatement may be made, or if 
the work load does not warrant the filling of such 
vacancy, the name of such person shall be placed upon a 
preferred list for his former position, and he shall be 
eligible for reinstatement from such preferred list for 
a period of four years. In the event that such person 
is reinstated to a position in a grade lower than that 
of his former position, his name shall be placed on the 
preferred eligible list for his former position or any 
similar position. This section shall not be deemed to 
modify or supersede any other provisions of law 
applicable to the re-employment of persons retired from 
the public service on account of disability. 
Although written in terms protecting employees' rights, CSL 
§71 has been interpreted to allow an employer to terminate an 
employee who is absent from work for a cumulative period of one 
year due to an occupational injury or disease.-7 
Our inquiry under this charge is not ended, however, simply 
upon recognition that the Town is empowered to terminate an 
employee pursuant to CSL §71. Indeed, it is the Town's very power 
to terminate or not which is necessary before there can be any 
basis for the imposition of a bargaining obligation. For example, 
if the Town were required by CSL §71 to terminate an employee 
after one year's absence from work, then there could not be any 
decisional bargaining. The question before us is whether the 
Town's exercise of the discretion bestowed under CSL §71 must be 
bargained or whether CSL §71 plainly and clearly establishes a 
-''Allen v. Howe, 84 N.Y.2d 665 (1994) (upholding Civil Service 
Department's regulations as against claims that they abridged 
constitutional rights). 
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legislative intent to exempt an employer from a duty to bargain 
discharges from employment based upon the length of absence from 
work attributable to job-related injury or illness.^ 
There is nothing in CSL §71 which deals explicitly with 
collective negotiations under the Act, nor is there anything 
inescapably implicit in that statute which establishes the 
Legislature's plain and clear intent to exempt the Town from the 
State's strong public policy favoring the negotiation of all terms 
and conditions of employment.-7 Although the Court of Appeals in 
Allen v. Howe-7 recognized that terminations under CSL §71 
promote a governmental interest in a productive and economically 
efficient civil service, it also recognized the substantial 
interests of employees in their continued employment. The system 
of mandatory collective negotiations under the Act is intended to 
permit and promote the mutual reconciliation of precisely these 
types of competing interests. By requiring the negotiation of 
decisions to terminate employees from employment based upon the 
length of time they are away from work due to occupational 
injuries or illnesses, and in the absence of a plain and clear 
^Compare. e.g.F Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the 
CitV of New York V. PERB. 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB f7012 (1990) 
(exercise of statutory rights regarding employees' financial 
disclosure subject to decisional bargaining obligations under the 
Act) with Webster Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 619, 23 
PERB f7013 (1990), and City Sch. Dist. of the City of Elmira v. 
PERB, 74 N.Y.2d 395, 22 PERB f7032 (1989) (legislative intent to 
exempt decisions from mandatory negotiation found). 
^Citv of Schenectady v. PERB. 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB f7005 
(1995) . 
^Supra note 6. 
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legislative intent to the contrary, we give effect to the State's 
declared public policy favoring collective negotiations. The 
Town's unilateral adoption of a policy requiring termination of. 
employment and contractual benefits after one year of occupational 
disability is permitted but not required by CSL §71 and 
constituted a change in terms and conditions of employment. 
The Town's exceptions are, accordingly, denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Immediately cease enforcement or implementation of its 
"Administrative Policy §207-c", which provides for the 
termination from employment of officers who have been 
receiving GML §207-c benefits for one year or more. 
2. Immediately reinstate any officer who was terminated 
pursuant to said "Administrative Policy §207-c", and 
make whole unit employees for any wages or benefits lost 
as a result of any enforcement or implementation of 
"Administrative Policy §207-c", with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Immediately cease enforcement or implementation of those 
parts of the Town's "§207-c Administrative Procedure" 
pertaining to notification of accident, injury or 
illness; required use of leave credits; and time limits 
for appeal of light duty assignments or GML §207-c 
determinations. 
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4. Immediately rescind the denial of any GML §207-c 
application occasioned by an officer's noncompliance 
with the parts of the "§207-c Administrative Procedure" 
set forth in paragraph 3 above. 
5. Make whole unit employees for any wages or benefits lost 
as a result of a denial of a GML §207-c application 
occasioned by an officer's noncompliance with the parts 
of the "§207-c Administrative Procedure" set forth in 
paragraph 3 above, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations where written communications for unit 
employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 

NOTICE TO ALI EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by New York State Federation of Police, Inc., that the Town of 
Cortlandt will: 
1. Immediately cease enforcement or implementation of its "Administrative Policy §207-c", which 
provides for the termination from employment of officers who have been receiving General Municipal 
Law (GML) §207-c benefits for one year or more. 
2. Immediately reinstate any officer who was terminated pursuant to said "Administrative Policy §207-c", and 
make whole unit employees for any wages or benefits lost as a result of any enforcement or implementation 
of "Administrative Policy §207-c", with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Immediately cease enforcement or implementation of those parts of the Town's "§207-c Administrative 
Procedure" pertaining to notification of accident, injury or illness; required use of leave credits; and time limits 
for appeal of light duty assignments or GML §207-c determinations. 
4. Immediately rescind the denial of any GML §207-c application occasioned by an officer's noncompliance with 
the parts of the "§207-c Administrative Procedure" set forth in paragraph 3 above. 
5. Make whole unit employees for any wages or benefits lost as a result of a denial of a GML §207-c application 
occasioned by an officer's noncompliance with the parts of the "§207-c Administrative Procedure" set forth 
in paragraph 3 above, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF CORTLANDT 
Tms Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Jn the Matter of 
VESTAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
NEA, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17344 
VESTAL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JANET AXELROD, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD 6. BEYER, JR. 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, LLP (JOHN B. HOGAN Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Vestal 
Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a charge filed by the Vestal 
Employees Association, NEA/NY, NEA (Association). The 
Association alleges in its charge that the District violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when, on September 1, 1995, it unilaterally transferred, 
pursuant to a contract with the Broome-Tioga Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services (Broome BOCES), the printing duties which 
had been performed exclusively by a District employee in the 
Association's unit. 
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After a hearing, the A U held that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act.i7 In finding the refusal to negotiate, 
the A U held that: 1. the Association had satisfied the notice 
of claim requirements of Education Law §3813 by timely serving a 
copy of the charge upon the Secretary to the Clerk of the Board 
of Education; 2. the Association had exclusivity over the 
printing, copying and related duties transferred for performance 
by the Broome BOCES' employee^7; 3. the transfer was mandatorily 
negotiable because Education Law §1950(4)(d) and Webster Central 
School District v. PERB^7 (hereafter Webster) did not apply to a 
shared service arrangement involving printing services because 
that statute and that decision are limited to agreements among 
school districts and a BOCES to share academic services and 
services which are closely related thereto involving the 
"nurturance of pupils and academics11-7; and 4. the transfer was 
executive in nature, not legislative, such that Odessa-Montour 
Central School District v. PERB^7 was not applicable. 
^The AU" dismissed the §209-a.l(a) allegation for lack of proof 
and no exceptions have been taken to the AU's decision in this 
respect. 
-
7The District's former employee accepted employment with BOCES 
in the same capacity. 
5775 N.Y.2d 619, 23 PERB J[7013 (1990). 
^Contra Scio Cent. Sch. Dist.. 29 PERB 54525 (1996) (Webster 
applicable to agreements to share the delivery of 
noninstructional services). 
57
 A.D.2d _, 29 PERB f7009 (3d Dep't 1996). The Appellate 
Division there held that no cause of action under §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act is stated where the action in issue is taken by a 
legislative body of government in its legislative capacity. 
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The District takes exception to the conclusions of law 
underlying each of the ALJ's enumerated holdings. The 
Association in response argues that the ALJ's decision is correct 
in all respects and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse on the ground that the Court of Appeals7 
decision in Webster is controlling and requires a determination 
that Education Law §1950(4)(d) establishes a plain and clear 
legislative intent that the District's transfer of printing 
services pursuant to contract with Broome BOCES is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Webster involved a school district's contract with a BOCES 
for summer school instructional programs pursuant to Education 
Law §1950(4)(bb). The Court of Appeals held that, although the 
Education Law was not explicit, it nevertheless "plainly and 
clearly" established a legislative intent that a school 
district's decision to contract with a BOCES for an academic 
summer school program, which effected a transfer of exclusive 
bargaining unit work, not be subject to mandatory collective 
bargaining. In reaching its conclusion in Webster. the Court 
relied upon the following features of the Education Law regarding 
contracts for shared academic services: 1. the annual nature of 
the procedure for securing BOCES' services; 2. the need for a 
request by two or more school districts; 3. the approval required 
of the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) of the contract 
with BOCES; 4. the short time frame for compliance with the 
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statutory procedures; and 5. the job protections available by law 
to teachers upon a BOCES takeover of a school district's academic 
program. 
This case presents two questions pertaining to the issue of 
legislative intent. The first is whether Education Law 
§1950(4)(d) applies to the noninstructional services in issue 
under this, charge because the Education Law cannot be the source 
of any relevant legislative intent if it is not applicable. 
Education Law §1950(4)(d) provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
At the request of component school districts, and 
with the approval of the commissioner of education, 
provide any of the following services on a cooperative 
basis: school nurse teacher, attendance supervisor, 
supervisor of teachers, dental hygienist, psychologist, 
teachers of art, music, physical education, vocational 
subjects, guidance counsellors, operation of special 
classes for handicapped children, as such term is 
defined in article eighty-nine of this chapter; pupil 
and financial accounting service by means of mechanical 
equipment; maintenance and operation of cafeteria or 
restaurant service for the use of pupils and teachers 
while at school, and such other services as the 
commissioner of education may approve. 
In our opinion, the ALJ's holding that §1950(4)(d) is 
inapplicable to contracts between school districts and a BOCES to 
share noninstructional services is incorrect. The District's 
contract with Broome BOCES was a so-called "CO-SER" agreement 
involving other school districts. Such contracts cannot exist 
without the approval of the Commissioner. The Commissioner had 
to have approved the District's CO-SER contract with Broome BOCES 
to have enabled Broome BOCES to perform. The Commissioner's 
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approval of that CO-SER agreement necessarily represents the 
Commissioner's opinion that the printing services in issue in 
this case fall within the "other services" which may be the 
subject of a shared services agreement under Education Law 
§1950(4)(d). Deference is properly accorded to the 
Commissioner's interpretation of this Education Law provision, 
which is unrelated by its terms to the labor relations issues 
within our recognized expertise. That deference is all the more 
appropriate because Education Law §1950(4)(d) is reasonably 
susceptible to the interpretation given it by the Commissioner. 
Financial accounting services are among those specifically listed 
as ones which school districts can deliver on a cooperative basis 
through a BOCES. That type of service is unrelated to either the 
instruction or the nurturing of pupils. The specific inclusion 
in §1950(4)(d) of a noninstructional service as one eligible for 
a shared services agreement is persuasive evidence that Education 
Law §1950(4)(d) is not limited to instructional programs or 
services closely related to instructional services. 
Although Education Law §1950(4)(d) is applicable to the 
noninstructional services in issue under this charge, there is 
still left for consideration the second question: whether 
Education Law §1950(4)(d), like §1950(4)(bb) in issue in Webster. 
similarly reflects a plain and clear legislative intent to exempt 
the District's decision to contract with Broome BOCES for 
printing services from the scope of mandatory bargaining under 
the Act. 
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On that second question, Education Law §1950(4)(d) has every 
factor relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Webster except one. 
Unlike the situation in Webster. the Education Law does not 
address the job protections for employees who have lost their 
nonteaching positions with a school district as a result of a 
takeover by a BOCES of some aspect of that school district's 
noninstructional services. Although the absence of statutory job 
protections is relevant in assessing the legislature's intent as 
to a school district's bargaining obligations, we do not consider 
it sufficient to occasion a result any different from that in 
Webster.^ As Webster is not reasonably distinguishable, and as 
the Court's decision is binding upon us, it must be concluded 
that the District's transfer of printing services to Broome BOCES 
was not a mandatory subject of negotiation.^ 
Having held that the District was not required to negotiate 
its decision to contract with Broome BOCES for the services in 
issue under this charge, the charge must be dismissed. 
Accordingly, we do not reach any of the District's other 
exceptions. 
^Accord Marcus Whitman Cent. Sch. Dist.. 27 PERB 14508 (1994) 
(Webster applicable notwithstanding the absence of job 
protections for employees affected by a transfer of work to a 
BOCES). 
^See, e.g., City Sch. Dist. of the City of Elmira v. PERB. 74 
N.Y.2d 395, 22 PERB J[7032 (1989) (legislative intent to exempt 
decision as to whether or not to apply for funds to be used for 
salary found where imposition of bargaining obligation would 
frustrate intent of Education Law). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
aUline^  R. Kinsella, Chi airperson 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM B. DYE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18321 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM B. DYE, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William B. Dye 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing as untimely his improper 
practice charge. Dye's charge alleges that the New York City 
Transit Authority (Authority) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) and 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Dye was informed that the charge was deficient and he filed 
several.amendments, including one filed on November 28, 1996, 
which was not sworn to, and one on December 20, 1996. The 
November 28 and December 2 0 amendments named for the first time 
the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) as a respondent. 
Dye excepts to the Director's dismissal, arguing that his 
receipt, on June 25, 1996, of an arbitrator's decision in a 
disciplinary action was within four months of the filing of his 
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improper practice charge and, therefore, the charge is timely 
filed. 
Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the decision 
of the Director. 
Dye's original charge was filed against the Authority on 
October 25, 1996. He alleges in that charge, and in his 
subsequent amendments, that he was engaged in protected activity, 
that the Authority filed disciplinary charges against him and 
caused delays in the processing of those charges because of his 
activities. In his subsequent amendments, Dye alleges that the 
TWU failed to adequately represent him on those disciplinary 
charges. At the close of a disciplinary hearing on June 25, 
1996, the arbitrator issued a "bench award" setting Dye's penalty 
as "time served" and returning him to work. A written decision, 
confirming the bench ruling, issued on October 12, 1996. 
The alleged violations by the Authority occurred before 
June 25, 1996, more than four months prior to the filing of the 
original charge. There is no allegation of misconduct by the 
Authority on or after June 25. Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's 
Rules of Procedure, requires that an improper practice charge be 
filed within four months of the occurrence of the acts alleged to 
be improper. The Director's dismissal of the allegations against 
the Authority is, therefore, affirmed. 
As to the TWU, the charge is also untimely. Dye did not 
name the TWU as a respondent until November 28, 1996. The 
timeliness of the allegations against TWU must be measured from 
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the date the amendment first naming TWU as a respondent was 
filed, not the date of the original charge against the Authority. 
The last action by TWU alleged to have violated the Act occurred 
on June 25, 1996, the last day of Dye's disciplinary hearing, 
when TWU allegedly unfairly represented him. As this was more 
than four months before the filing of the amendment to the charge 
which first named TWU as a respondent, the charge against TWU is 
untimely. The issuance of the written decision in October 1996, 
although within four months of the charge against TWU, was a 
purely ministerial act because it merely confirmed the terms and 
implementation of the June 25 bench award. TWU's representation 
function ceased as of June 25, which was also the date Dye knew 
of the disposition of his disciplinary charges. Therefore, Dye's 
receipt of a written confirmation of that disposition cannot 
serve to extend his time to file his charge against TWU. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
arguments made by Dye, the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4630 
THREE VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4630 page 2 
Unit: Included: All employees of the School Aged Child Care 
and Kids Place Program employed by the Three 
Village School District in the positions of 
Clerical, Child Care Assistant, Child Care 
Teacher, Teacher Assistant. Assistant 
Supervisor and Supervisor. if 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
I/^fL^VO^U 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
5ric J./^Schmertz, Member 
1/ The parties agree that the Assistant Supervisor and 
Supervisor do not perform the traditional supervisory duties 
that might create a conflict of interest. 
\ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY . 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4643 




TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, 
Intervenor. 
i 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 182 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative' 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
Certification - C-4643 
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grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time employees of the Upper Mohawk 
Valley Regional Water Board 
Excluded: All upper level management personnel and 
employees represented by the Management 
Employees Association of the Upper Mohawk 
Valley Regional Water Board. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 182. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 28, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
<0&6t<UsOt> 
Schmertz, Member 
